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Abstract
& Conscious behavioral intentions can frequently fail under
conditions of attentional depletion. In attempting to trace
the cognitive origin of this effect, we hypothesized that
failures of action control—specifically, oculomotor move-
ment—can result from the imposition of fronto-executive
load. To evaluate this prediction, participants performed an
antisaccade task while simultaneously completing a working-
memory task that is known to make variable demands on
prefrontal processes (n-back task, see Jonides et al., 1997).
The results of two experiments are reported. As expected,
antisaccade error rates were increased in accordance with
the fronto-executive demands of the n-back task (Experi-
ment 1). In addition, the debilitating effects of working-
memory load were restricted to the inhibitory component of
the antisaccade task (Experiment 2). These findings corrob-
orate the view that working memory operations play a
critical role in the suppression of prepotent behavioral
responses. &
INTRODUCTION
Action slips serve as timely reminders of the power of
unconscious (i.e., automatic) behavioral forces (James,
1890; Freud, 1901/1966). Notwithstanding the posses-
sion of a conscious intention to take a novel route to
work, one may nevertheless find oneself following the
regular path to the office. Similarly, attempts to call a
new partner may flounder as one finds oneself dialing
the apartment of his or her immediate predecessor. In
tracing the cognitive origin of behavioral lapses such as
these, researchers have noted that action slips com-
monly arise when people’s current objectives and estab-
lished behavioral propensities are in conflict or
opposition (Reason, 1979). As James (1890) memorably
observed, ‘‘Persons in going to their bedroom to dress
for dinner have been known to take off one garment
after another and finally to get into bed, merely because
that was the habitual issue of the first few movements
when performed at a later hour’’ (p. 155). Inspection of
the available literature on this topic reveals that action
slips are most likely to occur when the mind is otherwise
engaged in some concurrent mental activity, such as
daydreaming, rumination, or listening to the radio (e.g.,
Norman, 1981; Reason, 1979). Put simply, behavioral
lapses are the result of a preoccupied or distracted
mind.
That distraction can prompt the failure of conscious
behavioral intentions has been demonstrated by Wegner
and his colleagues in their influential research on mental
control (see Wegner, 1994). The empirical findings tell a
compelling tale. Under conditions of attentional deple-
tion, not only does behavioral self-regulation fail, but
perceivers are propelled into performing actions they
are trying to avoid. For example, instructed not to blast a
golf putt past the cup, perceivers proceed to do just
that—sending the ball on average 20 cm past its in-
tended target, but only under conditions of resource
depletion. Similarly, participants swing a handheld pen-
dulum more frequently along a forbidden axis when
under cognitive load (Wegner, Ansfield, & Pillof, 1998).
But why exactly do action slips emerge in attentionally
demanding task environments? In particular, what is it
about resource depletion and the dynamics of action
control that prompts conscious intentions to fail and
perceivers to produce prepotent behavioral responses
(Norman, 1981; Reason, 1979; James, 1890)?
According to conventional wisdom, fronto-executive
operations are believed to play a fundamental role in the
regulation of thought and action. Norman and Shallice
(1986), for example, have argued that action is con-
trolled either by preexisting behavioral schemas that
guide response selection in familiar settings, or else by
a frontally mediated Supervisory Attentional System
(SAS) that guides the elicitation of action in novel,
surprising, or dangerous task environments (see also
Baddeley, 1996). With regard to the higher-order control
of action, one critical function of the SAS is to inhibit the
execution of overlearned responses in contextually in-
appropriate settings (Damasio, 1994; Shallice, 1988;
Baddeley, 1986, 1996; Luria, 1966). Thus, the appear-
ance of a green light would not prompt one to drive
across an intersection, if a pedestrian was still standing 1Harvard University,
2Dartmouth College,
3University of Bristol
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regulate the elicitation of habitual or overlearned re-
sponses in this manner is apparent from the behavior of
individuals who have suffered damage to the prefrontal
cortex (PFC; Kimberg & Farah, 1993; Fuster, 1989;
Shallice, 1988; Lhermitte, 1983). On a range of tasks
that are sensitive to frontal functioning (e.g., Wisconsin
Card Sort Task, Tower of Hanoi Task, and Stroop Task)
these persons typically demonstrate an inability to sup-
press inappropriate behaviors in favor of strategies that
would lead to correct responding (see Shallice, 1988). In
other words, executive dysfunction impairs the mind’s
ability to replace prepotent responses with goal-relevant
behavioral responses (Shallice, 1988; Norman & Shallice,
1986).
Interestingly, it is not only frontal patients who may
display an inability to inhibit habitual responses. It
should be possible, at least in principle, to induce similar
effects (albeit temporarily) in healthy adults under spe-
cific dual-task conditions (Stuyven, Van der Goten,
Vandierendonck, Claeys, & Crevits, 2000; Roberts, Ha-
ger, & Heron, 1994). All that may be needed to realize
this objective is: (i) an experimental task in which
people’s processing goals and prepotent behavioral
tendencies are in opposition; and (ii) a concurrent
activity that impairs the efficiency of fronto-executive
operations. One task that quite clearly satisfies the
former requirement is the antisaccade task (Hallet,
1978). Saccadic eye movements to visual stimuli can be
generated either reflexively or intentionally (Findlay,
1981). Reflexive saccades occur rapidly and are initiated
in response to abrupt visual onsets. Intentional saccades,
in contrast, take longer to execute and are triggered by
people’s processing goals. In the antisaccade task (Hal-
let, 1978), a peripheral stimulus appears on the screen
while the participant is fixating on a central cue. The
participant’s task is simply to suppress the reflexive (i.e.,
prepotent) response toward the stimulus and to make
an intentional saccade in the opposite direction. Per-
formance is then compared with a prosaccade condition
in which the participant’s instruction is to look at the
peripheral stimulus. Generally speaking, antisaccades
take longer to initiate than prosaccades and saccade
direction errors (i.e., action slips) are more common in
the anti- than the prosaccade condition (Everling &
Fischer, 1998).
Of relevance to the present investigation, two neuro-
anatomical systems are acknowledged to play a prom-
inent role in the control of saccadic eye movements (see
Everling & Fischer, 1998). While reflexive saccades are
initiated primarily by activity in the superior colliculus
(SC), a structure in the midbrain, antisaccade generation
critically involves areas of the PFC. Evidence to corrob-
orate the involvement of fronto-executive operations in
the suppression of reflexive saccades comes from a
variety of sources. Guitton, Bu ¨chtel, and Douglas
(1985), for example, contrasted the antisaccade per-
formance of patients with damage to the prefrontal or
temporal cortex. The results revealed that only frontal
patients showed elevated error rates on the task, pa-
tients with temporal lobe lesions were not impaired
(Paus et al., 1991). Similarly, Pierrot-Deseilligny, Rivaud,
Gaymard, and Agid (1991) compared the antisaccade
performance of patients with lesions in different regions
of the frontal lobes. Whereas damage to PFC resulted in
an antisaccade deficit (Fukushima et al., 1988), impair-
ment did not result for patients whose lesions were
restricted to either the frontal or supplementary eye
fields (FEF or SEF). Another strand of evidence comes
from the neuroimaging literature. Although imaging
studies have yet to provide a fully coherent picture,
what is apparent is that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) appears to play a prominent role in the gen-
eration of antisaccades (Doricchi et al., 1997; Sweeney,
Mintun, & Kwee, 1996). Finally, increased antisaccade
error rates have also been observed in older adults, a
group that is believed to display impairments in the
efficiency of executive functioning (Butler, Zacks, &
Henderson, 1999). Taken together, these findings con-
firm the involvement of fronto-executive operations in
the suppression of reflexive saccades. When these pro-
cesses are compromised through cortical insult or the
cognitive changes associated with aging, elevated error
rates are observed on the antisaccade task.
But is it also possible to elicit antisaccade errors in
healthy younger adults under conditions of experimen-
tally induced fronto-executive load? Recent research
suggests that indeed it may, with working memory
serving a critical function in the suppression of reflex-
ive eye movements (Stuyven et al., 2000; Roberts et al.,
1994). A common component of tasks that are known
to be sensitive to frontal functioning, such as the
antisaccade task, is that they involve the suppression
of a prepotent or overlearned response (i.e., a reflexive
saccade). To inhibit this response, of course, partic-
ipants must be able to maintain the relevant task
instructions in memory (i.e., ‘look away from the
peripheral stimulus’), otherwise errors (reflexive sac-
cades) are likely to occur (see also Kimberg & Farah,
1993; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). Supporting
this viewpoint, Roberts et al. (1994) demonstrated an
increase in antisaccade error rates under dual-task
conditions in which participants were required to
perform a demanding working-memory task (i.e., men-
tal arithmetic). Importantly, a less demanding concur-
rent activity (i.e., digit verbalization) failed to impair
the suppression of reflexive saccades, prompting Rob-
erts et al. to conclude that, ‘‘increasing concurrent
working-memory load increases reflexive responding’’
(p. 391). But why exactly does working-memory load
moderate performance on the antisaccade task? What is
it about certain concurrent tasks that prompts con-
scious intentions to fail and reflexive responding to
ensue?
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ory processes—particularly, executive operations—play
a critical role in the inhibition of prepotent behavioral
responses (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995; Goldman-
Rakic, 1995; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1993; Kimberg &
Farah, 1993; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Dehaene
& Changeux, 1991; Fuster, 1989; Levine & Prueitt, 1989;
Norman & Shallice, 1986). As such, only when concur-
rent tasks make notable demands on the efficiency of
prefrontal processes may performance on the antisac-
cade task be impaired. Although previous research has
alluded to this possibility (Roberts et al., 1994), the
reported results provide only indirect evidence for this
viewpoint as compelling neuroimaging data are not yet
available for these specific working memory task. As a
result, it is unclear the extent to which fronto-executive
operations were involved in the working-memory tasks
that participants were required to perform (Stuyven
et al., 2000; Roberts et al., 1994). Consequently,
although the results are suggestive, it is not possible to
conclude that reflexive responding is exacerbated under
conditions of fronto-executive load. What is apparent is
that dual tasks that make minimal or no demands on
executive operations do not promote reflexive respond-
ing (Stuyven et al., 2000; Roberts et al., 1994). To
provide unequivocal evidence for such a link, one
requires a working memory task that makes known
(and variable) demands on prefrontal operations.
One task that offers such a possibility is the n-back
task (Jonides et al., 1997; Smith & Jonides, 1997). In this
task, participants are presented with a series of letters
(or numbers) and for each one they have to decide
whether it matches the item that preceded it by n places
in the sequence. For example, a 1-back task requires
participants to judge whether the current letter is the
same as the preceding item in the sequence. Some
n-back paradigms also include a 0-back condition in
which participants judge whether the current letter is
the same asa target letter that was specified previouslyby
theexperimenter.Whatistheoreticallynoteworthyabout
this monitoring task is that neuroimaging studies (i.e.,
PET) have confirmed that as the number of n increases
from 0 to 1 to 2, regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in a
number of brain regions increases (or decreases) in a
linear fashion (Jonides et al., 1997). Indeed, this is the
case for a number of frontal areas. Critically, however,
rCBF change in DLPFC does not conform to this linear
pattern. Instead, relative to a control condition, rCBF
increases of 1.39% and 1.34% are observed during the
0-back and 1-back tasks, respectively; but an increase of
3.44% is observed in the 2-back task. This confirms,
therefore, that the 2-back task makes different demands
on functional subsystems within the frontal lobes (Jo-
nides et al., 1997). In particular, systems anterior to the
FEF are differentially affected by working-memory load.
These neuroimaging results are valuable as they en-
able one to make precise predictions about the effects
that may be observed when a saccadic eye movement
and n-back task are performed simultaneously. As pro-
saccade performance does not critically entail frontal
operations (Everling & Fischer, 1998), the concurrent
performance of an n-back task (0-, 1-, or 2-back) should
not disrupt people’s ability to saccade in the direction of
a peripheral target. Quite different effects should
emerge, however, when one considers performance on
an antisaccade task. Specifically, whereas 0- and 1-back
tasks should impair performance to a similar (and
marginal) degree, a 2-back task should have a more
disruptive impact on people’s ability to suppress reflex-
ive saccades, essentially because it makes greater de-
mands on fronto-executive operations, particularly
functions localized in the DLPFC (Jonides et al., 1997;
Smith & Jonides, 1997). Thus, despite the conscious
intention to look away from a peripherally presented
stimulus, under conditions of experimentally induced
fronto-executive load (i.e., 2-back task), participants may
find it notoriously difficult to ignore the said item. We
investigated this prediction in the two experiments
reported herein. The purpose of the present research
was twofold. First, to establish the effects of working-
memory load on the elicitation of reflexive saccades (i.e.,
Experiment 1). Second, to identify the components of
oculomotor control that are impeded under conditions
of fronto-executive load (i.e., Experiment 2).
RESULTS
Experiment 1
In our first experiment, participants performed blocks of
antisaccade and prosaccade trials while simultaneously
completing an n-back task that makes variable demands
on fronto-executive operations (see Jonides et al., 1997).
The results are summarized below.
Saccade Direction Accuracy
Table 1 presents the eye movement data. We did not
analyze trials in which: (i) participants were not looking
at the fixation circle when the peripheral stimulus
appeared; (ii) the latency of the initial saccade was less
than 75 msec (i.e., anticipatory saccades); (iii) the
latency of the response was greater than 3 standard
deviations from the mean (i.e., outliers); and (iv) eye
movement was less than 18 in the horizontal plane.
Application of these criteria eliminated 7.7% of the data.
Errors were trials on which the participant’s first saccade
was in the wrong direction and error rates were calcu-
lated as the proportion of correct saccades given the
total number of trials in the analysis (per participant).
These data were then submitted to a 2 (condition:
prosaccade or antisaccade)  4 (concurrent task: none
or 0-, 1-, or 2-back) repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA). This revealed main effects of both
condition [F(1,15) = 10.44, p < .01] and concurrent task
Mitchell, Macrae, and Gilchrist 97[F(3,45) = 6.64, p < .001] on the accuracy of partic-
ipants’ saccades. As expected, however, these effects
were qualified by a Condition  Concurrent Task inter-
action [F(3,45) = 2.90, p < .05; see Table 1]. Simple
effects analysis confirmed that whereas prosaccades
were not affected by the imposition of a concurrent task
[(F(3,45) = 2.05, ns], antisaccade performance was
substantially impaired under dual-task conditions [F(3,
45) = 5.40, p < .01]. Critically, post hoc comparisons
revealed that performance on the antisaccade task dif-
fered only between the 1- and 2-back conditions
( p < .04). There was no difference in performance
between the 0- and 1-back conditions and only a margin-
ally significant decrement in performance between the
control and 0-back conditions ( p < .09). Interestingly,
these results parallel the rCBF increases (1.39%, 1.34%,
and 3.44% rCBF change in the 0-, 1-, and 2-back tasks,
respectively) that have been observed in the DLPFC
while participants perform the n-back task (Jonides
et al., 1997; Smith & Jonides, 1997). As one would expect
from the neuroimaging data (Jonides et al., 1997),
antisaccade performance was most impaired in the 2-
back condition and differences did not emerge between
the 0- and 1-back conditions.
Latency of Correct Saccades
A 2 (condition: prosaccade or antisaccade)  4 (con-
current task: none or 0-, 1-, or 2-back) repeated meas-
ures ANOVA was undertaken on the data. This revealed
a main effect of condition on participants’ latencies
[F(1,15) = 94.25, p < .001]. Antisaccade latencies
(M = 218 msec) were slower than prosaccade latencies
(M = 163 msec). The analysis also revealed a Condition
 Concurrent Task interaction [F(3,45) = 4.19, p < .01].
Additional analyses confirmed an effect of concurrent
task on prosaccade [F(3,45) = 3.06, p < .04], but not
antisaccade latencies. Inspection of the prosaccade treat-
ment means revealed that response latencies were
fastest in the 1-back than the other three conditions.
Importantly, there was no systematic increase in latency
across conditions consistent with a speed–accuracy
trade off.
n-Back Performance
Table 1 presents the n-back data. Errors comprised
trials on which participants made an incorrect re-
sponse or trials on which no response was given.
The data were submitted to a 2 (condition: prosac-
cade or antisaccade)  4 (concurrent task: 0-back or
1-back or 2-back) repeated measures ANOVA. This
revealed only a main effect of concurrent task on
participants’ n-back performance [F(2,30) = 11.35,
p < .001]. As expected, performance on the n-back
task was best in the 0-back condition and worst in the
2-back condition. Post hoc comparisons confirmed
that while performance in the 0- and 1-back condi-
tions did not differ significantly, reliable differences
emerged between the 1- and 2-back conditions ( p <
.001). Critically, the failure to obtain a Condition 
Concurrent Task interaction indicated that, regardless
of the direction of saccadic eye movements, the n-
back task imposed equivalent cognitive demands on
participants’ processing capacity. A 2 (condition: pro-
saccade or antisaccade)  4 (concurrent task: 0-, 1-, or
2-back) repeated measures ANOVA was undertaken on
the latencies of correct n-back trials. This revealed
main effects of condition [F(1,15) = 5.21, p < .04]
and concurrent task [F(2, 30) = 5.37, p < .02] on
participants’ response times. Latencies were slower in
the antisaccade than the prosaccade condition and
response times were greater as the demands of the
n-back task increased. There was no evidence of a
Condition  Concurrent Task interaction on partici-
pants’ response latencies [F(2,30) < 1, ns].
Discussion
These findings provide preliminary support for our
predictions. As expected, the error rate in the anti-
saccade task was elevated under dual-task conditions
that are known to make significant demands on
fronto-executive operations (Jonides et al., 1997; Smith
& Jonides, 1997). Thus, it is not only frontal patients
or older adults who may be unable to suppress
Table 1. Saccade and n-Back Performance as a Function of
Working-Memory Load (Experiment 1)
Memory Load
Control 0-Back 1-Back 2-Back
Proportion correct
Saccade direction
prosaccade .984 .984 .966 .972
antisaccade .939 .913 .898 .866
n-back task
prosaccade – .950 .969 .920
antisaccade – .958 .944 .907
Correct trial response latency (msec)
Saccade direction
prosaccade 162 163 158 170
antisaccade 229 214 218 211
n-back task
prosaccade – 804 859 913
antisaccade – 755 797 830
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1985), similar effects can be observed in healthy young
adults under conditions of experimentally induced
executive load. Without the flexibility that fronto-exec-
utive functioning affords (Norman & Shallice, 1986),
participants found themselves looking at a stimulus
they were attempting to ignore. Of course, to perform
the antisaccade task successfully, participants must be
able to do at least two things (Everling & Fischer,
1998): (i) inhibit the generation of a reflexive saccade
to the peripheral stimulus (i.e., inhibitory component);
and (ii) initiate a voluntary eye movement in the
opposite direction (i.e., volitional component). What
is unclear from the results of Experiment 1, however,
is the extent to which working-memory load impairs
these different components of the antisaccade task
(Stuyven et al., 2000; Roberts et al., 1994). For exam-
ple, is it the case that the effects of working-memory
load are restricted to the inhibitory component of the
antisaccade task (Guitton et al., 1985), or do they
extend instead to both the suppression of reflexive
saccades and the generation of volitional eye move-
ments? Through the addition of a no-saccade condi-
tion to the standard antisaccade task (Walker, Husain,
Hodgson, Harrison, & Kennard, 1998), we investigated
this important issue in our second experiment. In the
no-saccade condition participants are simply required
to maintain fixation. Like the antisaccade task, such a
task required the inhibition of the reflexive saccade.
But, unlike the antisaccade task, it does not require
the generation of a voluntary eye movement.
Experiment 2
In our second experiment, participants completed
blocks of antisaccade and no-saccade trials while simul-
taneously performing various levels of the n-back task.
The results are summarized below.
Saccade Direction Accuracy
Table 2 presents the eye movement data. We did not
analyze trials in which the latency of the initial saccade
was less than 75 msec (i.e., anticipatory saccades) or the
latency of the response was greater than 3 standard
deviations from the mean (i.e., outliers). Application of
these criteria eliminated 1.1% of the data. For antisac-
cade blocks, errors were trials on which the participant’s
first saccade was in a direction other than directly away
from the peripheral target. For no-saccade blocks, errors
were trials on which the participant made an eye move-
ment greater than 18 in any direction. Error rates were
calculated as the proportion of correct saccades given
the total number of trials in the analysis (per partici-
pant). These data were then submitted to a 2 (condition:
no-saccade or antisaccade)  3 (concurrent task: 0-, 1-,
or 2-back) repeated measures ANOVA. This revealed
main effects of both condition [F(1,17) = 9.78, p <
.01] and concurrent task [F(2,34) = 5.36, p < .01] on
the accuracy of participants’ saccades. Importantly, how-
ever, the analysis failed to reveal a significant Condition
 Concurrent Task interaction [F(2,34) = 1.20, ns].
Post hoc comparisons revealed that task performance
differed only between the 1- and 2-back conditions ( p <
.04). There was no difference in performance between
the 0- and 1-back conditions. In addition, performance
was better in the no-saccade than the antisaccade task.
Thus, as the n-back task exerted equivalent effects on
both the no-saccade and antisaccade tasks, it would
appear that executive load impaired only the suppres-
sion of reflexive saccades, no additional disruptive ef-
fects were apparent on the initiation of volitional eye
movements.
Latency of Correct Antisaccades
A single factor (concurrent task: 0-, 1-, or 2-back)
repeated measures ANOVA was undertaken on the
latency of participants’ antisaccades (no such analysis
was possible for no-saccade blocks, since participants
were told not to move their eyes during these trials).
This analysis revealed that antisaccades were reliably
slower across the n-back conditions F(2,34) = 3.50,
p < .05]. Paralleling the pattern of participants’ errors,
post hoc comparisons confirmed that antisaccade laten-
cies differed between 0- and 1-back tasks ( p < .03) and
between 0- and 2-back tasks ( p < .05).
Table 2. Saccade and n-Back Performance as a Function of





no-saccade .887 .873 .840
antisaccade .706 .710 .638
n-back task
no-saccade .949 .920 .904
antisaccade .931 .905 .826
Correct trial response latency (msec)
Saccade direction
no-saccade – – –
antisaccade 244 262 256
n-back task
no-saccade 827 917 1005
antisaccade 1063 1141 1194
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Table 2 presents the n-back data. Errors comprised trials
on which participants made an incorrect response or
trials on which no response was given. The data were
submitted to a 2 (condition: no-saccade or antisaccade)
 3 (concurrent task: 0-, 1-, or 2-back) repeated meas-
ures ANOVA. This revealed only main effects of condi-
tion [F(1,17) = 4.39, p < .05] and concurrent task
[F(2,34) = 6.71, p < .01] on participants’ n-back per-
formance. As expected, performance on the n-back task
was best in the 0-back condition and worst in the 2-back
condition. Post hoc comparisons confirmed that while
performance in the 0- and 1-back conditions did not
differ significantly, reliable differences emerged between
the 1- and 2-back conditions ( p < .03). In addition,
performance was better in the no-saccade than the
antisaccade task. This latter finding is important as it
confirms that it is not simply combined task difficulty
that prompts the elicitation of reflexive eye movements
in the antisaccade task. In a less demanding task context
in which n-back performance is high (i.e., no-saccade
task), an identical pattern of effects is observed. A 2
(condition: no-saccade or antisaccade)  3 (concurrent
task: 0-, 1-, or 2-back) repeated measures ANOVA was
also undertaken on the latencies of correct n-back trials.
This revealed main effects of condition [F(1,17) = 26.43,
p < .001] and concurrent task [F(2,34) = 12.92, p <
.001] on participants’ response times. Latencies were
slower in the antisaccade than the no-saccade condition
and response times were greater as the demands of the
n-back task increased. There was no evidence of a
Condition  Concurrent Task interaction on partici-
pants’ response latencies [F(2,34) < 1, ns].
Discussion
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, the present
findings revealed an increase in reflexive responding
under conditions of fronto-executive load. In addition,
however, the observed performance decrement in the
2-back condition was traced to the debilitating effect of
working-memory load on the inhibitory component of
the antisaccade task (cf. Stuyven et al., 2000; Roberts
et al., 1994). Results in the no-saccade condition dis-
played the same general pattern as the rCBF increases
that have been observed in the DLPFC when participants
perform the n-back task (Jonides et al., 1997; Smith &
Jonides, 1997). Specifically, reflexive responding was
most pronounced in the 2-back condition and differ-
ences did not emerge between the 0- and 1-back con-
ditions. As the pattern of impairment was identical in the
antisaccade task, this suggests that working-memory
load exerts quite specific effects on the control of
saccadic eye movements. That is, whereas executive
load impairs people’s ability to suppress reflexive sac-
cades, it has little additional disruptive impact on their
capacity to generate volitional eye movements. In other
words, fronto-executive operations appear to play a
critical role in the inhibitory aspects of action control,
particularly the suppression of prepotent or overlearned
responses (see Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995; Shallice,
1988; Norman & Shallice, 1986).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Extending previous work on this topic, the present
research provided direct evidence for a relationship
between working-memory processes and the regulation
of saccadic eye movements (Stuyven et al., 2000; Roberts
et al., 1994). On the basis of existing neuroimaging data
(Jonides et al., 1997), we anticipated that reflexive
responding would be increased under dual-task condi-
tions that make notable demands on fronto-executive
operations (i.e., 2-back condition). Not only did our
results corroborate this prediction, but they also re-
vealed that executive load impairs the inhibitory com-
ponent of the antisaccade task (Everling & Fischer,
1998). In this way, the findings are consistent with the
view that the DLPFC plays a critical role in the gener-
ation of inhibitory responses. Indeed, inhibitory control
may be a primary function of specific regions of PFC
(Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber,
1992). But why exactly does fronto-executive load pro-
mote the elicitation of prepotent eye movements? How
does working memory interact with the suppression of
reflexive saccades?
According to Hallett (1978), reflexive saccades are
suppressed when frontal processes send a stop or can-
cellation signal to the SC. The timing of this signal,
however, is crucial. If its generation is delayed beyond
a critical point, reflexive responding ensues. Adopting
this viewpoint, Guitton et al. (1985) have suggested that
frontal patients show elevated error rates on the anti-
saccade task because of the time it takes them to gen-
erate the necessary cancellation signals. In this respect, it
is likely that operations shared by both working memory
and stop signal generation are implicated in the errant
eye movements that these patients produce. Funahashi,
Bruce, and Goldman-Rakic (1993), for example, have
shown that neurons in monkey DLPFC are involved not
only in the maintenance of the spatial location of a target
in memory, but also in the suppression of a response
toward that item. As such, if response inhibition is a basic
function of working memory, fronto-executive opera-
tions must surely be involved in the generation of
cancellation signals in the antisaccade task (Guiton et
al., 1985; Hallett, 1978). This viewpoint gains additional
support when one considers the direct and indirect
projections the SC receives from frontal areas (Gold-
man-Rakic, 1995; Fuster, 1989). When operating in an
unimpeded manner, executive processes send the nec-
essary cancellation signals to the SC during the antisac-
cade task. Under conditions of fronto-executive load (i.e.,
2-back task), however, the generation of these signals is
100 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 14, Number 1impeded and reflexive saccades are initiated. In this way,
then, working-memory processes and inhibitory opera-
tions work in concert to regulate the expression of
prepotent behavioral responses (see Walker et al., 1998).
Arguably the basis of human achievement resides in
people’s ability to withhold inappropriate responses, be
they sexual, emotional, or aggressive in nature. As
Bjorklund and Harnishfeger (1995) have noted, ‘‘inhib-
ition of prepotent, emotional, or learned responses
seems to be necessary for effective life in a complex
social primate group’’ (p. 166). In the context of an
oculomotor task, the present findings revealed how
fronto-executive operations provide the flexibility that
an adaptive behavioral repertoire requires. Through the
inhibition of a reflexive visual response, perceivers were
able to act in accordance with their conscious behavioral
intentions. Although restricted to the regulation of
saccadic eye movements, it is likely that the present
findings would extend to any task domain in which
perceivers’ current goals and prepotent behavioral ten-
dencies are in conflict or opposition (see also Jonides,
Smith, Marscuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998). In
other words, regardless of the task context, fronto-
executive load should promote behavioral rigidity and
reflexive responding (see Shallice, 1988; Norman &
Shallice, 1986). For example, on entering the bedroom
in a distracted state of mind, one may clamber into bed
rather than realize one’s intended objective of dressing
for dinner (James, 1890), if executive operations are
required for the planning, monitoring, or maintenance
of some concurrent mental activity. The failure of con-
scious behavioral intentions, moreover, need not be
triggered by cortical insult, mental illness, or the neuro-
logical changes associated with aging (Everling & Fisch-
er, 1998). Instead, action control can fail in healthy
younger adults under quite specific conditions—notably
dual-task settings that make consequential demands on
specific working-memory operations (Jonides et al.,
1997; Smith & Jonides, 1997). Without the flexibility that
fronto-executive functioning affords, reflexive (i.e., pre-




Sixteen students and research staff at the University of
Bristol participated in the experiment. The experiment
had a 2 (condition: prosaccade or antisaccade)  4
(concurrent task: none or 0-, 1-, or 2-back) repeated
measures design.
Procedure and Stimulus Materials
Eye movements were recorded with a SMI video-based
eyetracker controlled by an IBM-compatible microcom-
puter. The eyetracker sampled eye positions at a fre-
quency of 250 Hz, allowing saccade latencies to be
calculated with a temporal resolution of 4 msec. Spatial
calibration was carried out at the beginning of each
block of trials using a standard 9-point calibration
sequence. The operational spatial resolution of the
apparatus was 0.38 of visual angle. Stimuli were dis-
played on a 17-in. color VDU monitor and participants’
head movements were restrained by a chin rest (see
Gilchrist & Harvey, 2000, for further details). Each trial
began with participants fixating on a central circle. After
2000 msec, the circle was removed and a peripheral
target (a spherical white stimulus subtending 5.28 of
visual angle) appeared 4.88 to the left or right of
fixation. In four blocks of prosaccade trials, participants
were instructed to look directly at the peripheral target
as quickly as possible. In four blocks of antisaccade
trials, participants were instructed to move their eyes
horizontally away from the target. The conditions were
blocked and order of presentation was counterbal-
anced, with the constraint that prosaccade and antisac-
cade tasks alternated across the blocks. Each block
consisted of 60 trials, with the target appearing equally
often to the left and right of fixation. The location of
the target on each trial was randomized by the com-
puter. Of the eight experimental blocks, six comprised
the prosaccade and antisaccade tasks paired with the
various n-back conditions (i.e., 0, 1, and 2). The remain-
ing two blocks comprised control trials in which partic-
ipants performed only the prosaccade and antisaccade
tasks.
The n-back tasks were a close auditory analog to
those used in neuroimaging investigations of working
memory (Jonides et al., 1997; Smith & Jonides, 1997).
Participants heard a series of letters presented via
computer speakers. The set of items comprised all the
letters of the alphabet with a few exceptions to mini-
mize phonological confusion (i.e., b, c, d, g, n, v, and z).
A new letter was presented every 3000 msec. The
0-back task required participants to judge whether each
letter matched a target letter (e.g., F) that was specified
by the experimenter. The 1-back task required partic-
ipants to judge whether each letter matched the pre-
ceding item in the series, and the 2-back task required
participants to judge whether each letter matched the
item two back in the series. Participants made their
responses by pressing the appropriately labeled keys
(i.e., YES or NO) on the keyboard. Each n-back series
comprised a sequence of 60 letters (20 hits and 40
distractors). Following a period of fixation on the
central circle (i.e., 1000 msec), the next letter in the
n-back sequence was presented. After a further delay of
1000 msec, the fixation circle disappeared and the
peripheral target was displayed. The target remained
on the screen for 1000 msec, after which time the
fixation circle was displayed again, thereby signaling
the start of the next trial. Prior to recording their eye
Mitchell, Macrae, and Gilchrist 101movements, participants were familiarized with the
sound of each letter and the three n-back tasks. Follow-
ing the completion of all eight experimental blocks,




Eighteen students at the University of Bristol partici-
pated in the experiment. The experiment had a 2
(condition: no-saccade or antisaccade)  3 (concurrent
task: 0-, 1-, or 2-back) repeated measures design.
Procedure and Stimulus Materials
As in Experiment 1, each trial began with participants
fixating on a central circle and, after 2000 msec, the
circle was removed and a peripheral target appeared.
Given the relatively low error rate that was observed in
Experiment 1, attempts were made to increase the
difficulty of the antisaccade task in the present experi-
ment. Specifically, the peripheral target was changed
from a single white stimulus to a collection of 60 differ-
ent color photographs of various objects (i.e., house-
hold objects, people, sporting scenes, food, and
animals). These target stimuli were more varied and
visually complex than the white circle that was used in
Experiment 1. The photographs subtended 4.98 of visual
angle and could appear in one of four (rather than two)
locations on the screen: 4.08 above, below, to the left, or
to the right of the central fixation circle. In three blocks
of no-saccade trials (60 trials per block), participants
were instructed to continue looking in the center of the
screen throughout the block. In the three blocks of
antisaccade trials, participants were instructed to move
their eyes away (horizontally or vertically) from the
target. Each saccade task was paired once with each
n-back condition (i.e., 0, 1, and 2). Experiment 2 did not
include blocks in which there was no concurrent n-back
task. The n-back tasks were identical to those used in
Experiment 1. On completion of the experiment, partic-
ipants were debriefed, thanked for their participation,
and dismissed.
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